What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it? by Pettigrew, Richard
                          Pettigrew, R. (2019). What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?
Philosophical Studies, 1-37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Springer Verlag at
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?
Richard Pettigrew1
 The Author(s) 2019
Abstract Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology.
But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that
purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are
supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the argu-
ments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic
Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that
they no longer depend on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the
formulation of the norm under consideration.
One of the central tenets of traditional Bayesian epistemology is Conditionalization.
There are various formulations of this norm, but they all agree that it concerns the
way your credences should change in response to evidence. I spell out the three
formulations that I’ll consider below. On the first, Conditionalization concerns how
you actually update your credences when you receive a piece of evidence; on the
second, it concerns how you are disposed to update when you receive evidence; and
on the third, it concerns how you plan to update. In this paper, I am concerned not so
much with which formulation of the norm is correct—after all, they are not
incompatible with each other, and some are independent of each other. Rather, I am
concerned with which formulation is justified by the existing arguments.
I consider three versions of Conditionalization, and four arguments in their
favour. For each combination, I’ll ask whether the argument can support the norm
when it is formulated in that way. In each case, I note that the standard version of
the argument relies on a particular assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating
and which I formulate precisely below. I’ll ask whether the argument really does
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rely on this assumption, or whether it can be amended to support the norm without
that assumption.
This is important because Deterministic Updating says that your updating plan or
disposition should specify, for any piece of evidence you might receive, a unique
way to update on it. But this seems unmotivated, at least from the Bayesian point of
view. After all, subjective Bayesianism is a very permissive theory when it comes to
your initial credence function, that is, the one you have at the beginning of your
epistemic life before you’ve gathered any evidence. But, once that initial credence
function is chosen from the wide array that Bayesianism deems permissible, the
theory is very restrictive about how you should update your credences upon receipt
of new evidence. We tolerate this discrepancy because the same sorts of argument
seem to give us both the permissiveness of Probabilism and the restrictiveness of
Conditionalization. But if it turns out that these arguments only give the latter when
we make an unmotivated assumption, this spells trouble for Bayesianism.1
I don’t claim that the four arguments I consider here exhaust the putative
justifications of Conditionalization. Besides these, there are decision-theoretic
arguments by Savage (1954, Section 3.5), arguments from symmetry considerations
by van Fraassen (1989, Section 13.2) and Grove and Halpern (1998), and arguments
from a principle of minimal change due to Diaconis and Zabell (1982, Section 5.1)
and Dietrich et al. (2016). I focus on the four described here in the interests of space
and because these four arguments are naturally grouped together. We might call
them the teleological arguments for Conditionalization, for they seek to establish
that norm by pointing to ways that updating in the way it demands optimises
different aspects of the goodness of your credences, whether that is their pragmatic
utility or their epistemic utility. I leave the question of how the alternative, non-
teleological justifications of Conditionalization relate to the assumption of
Deterministic Updating to future work.2
I start in Sect. 1 by presenting the various formulations of the norm precisely.
Then I introduce the four arguments informally. Then, in Sect. 2, I introduce some
of the formal machinery required to state the arguments. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
contain the central results of the paper. In those sections, I work through each of the
four arguments in turn, provide its standard presentation, which assumes
Deterministic Updating, and then ask whether we can do without that assumption.
As we’ll see, for one of the arguments, we cannot do without Deterministic
Updating; for the other three, if we drop Deterministic Updating, we face a choice—
if we go one way, we can justify the three formulations of Conditionalization
without assuming Deterministic Updating; if we go the other way, we cannot. In
Sect. 7, I ask what lessons we can learn from these results.
1 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I mention this motivation.
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify the scope of the present paper.
R. Pettigrew
123
1 Three formulations and four arguments
Here are the three formulations of Conditionalization. According to the first, Actual
Conditionalization, the norm governs your actual updating behaviour.
Actual Conditionalization (AC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t (I’ll often refer to this as your prior);
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t0 comes in the form of a
proposition E learned with certainty;
(iii) cðEÞ[ 0;
(iv) c0 is your credence function at the later time t0 (I’ll often refer to this as
your posterior);
then it should be the case that c0ðÞ ¼ cðjEÞ ¼ cð & EÞ
cðEÞ .
According to the second, Plan Conditionalization, the norm governs the updating
behaviour you would endorse in all possible evidential situations you might face.
Plan Conditionalization (PC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t;
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t0 will come in the form of a
proposition learned with certainty, and that proposition will come from
the partition E ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng;3
(iii) R is the plan you endorse for how to update in response to each possible
piece of total evidence,
then it should be the case that, if you were to receive evidence Ei and if
cðEiÞ[ 0, then R would exhort you to adopt credence function
ciðÞ ¼ cðjEiÞ ¼ cð & EiÞcðEiÞ .
According to the third formulation, Dispositional Conditionalization, the norm
governs the updating behaviour you are disposed to exhibit.
Dispositional Conditionalization (DC)
If
(i) c is your credence function at t;
(ii) the total evidence you receive between t and t0 will come in the form of a
proposition learned with certainty, and that proposition will come from
the partition E ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng;
(iii) R is the plan you are disposed to follow in response to each possible
piece of total evidence,
then it should be the case that, if you were to receive evidence Ei and if
3 A partition is a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive propositions. That is, the disjunction of the
propositions is a tautology, and the conjunction of any two propositions is a contradiction.
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cðEiÞ[ 0, then R would exhort you to adopt credence function
ciðÞ ¼ cðjEiÞ ¼ cð & EiÞcðEiÞ .
Next, let’s meet the four arguments. Since it will take some work to formulate them
precisely, I will give only an informal gloss here. There will be plenty of time to see
them in high-definition in what follows.
Diachronic Dutch book or Dutch strategy argument (DSA) This purports to
show that, if you violate Conditionalization, there is a pair of decisions you
might face, one before and one after you receive your evidence, such that your
prior and posterior credences lead you to choose options when faced with
those decisions that are guaranteed to be worse by your own lights than some
alternative options (Lewis 1999).
Expected pragmatic utility argument (EPUA) This purports to show that, if you
will face a decision after learning your evidence, then your prior credences will
expect your updated posterior credences to do the best job of making that decision
only if they are obtained by conditionalizing on your priors (Savage 1954; Good
1967; Brown 1976).
Expected epistemic utility argument (EEUA) This purports to show that your
prior credences will expect your posterior credences to be best epistemically
speaking only if they are obtained by conditionalizing on your priors (Greaves
and Wallace 2006).
Epistemic utility dominance argument (EUDA)This purports to show that, if you
violate Conditionalization, then there will be alternative priors and posteriors
that are guaranteed to be better epistemically speaking, when considered
together, than your priors and posteriors (Briggs and Pettigrew 2018).
2 The framework
In the following sections, I will consider each of the arguments listed above. As we
will see, these arguments are concerned directly with updating plans or dispositions,
rather than actual updating behaviour. That is, the targets of these arguments—the
items that they assess for rationality or irrationality—don’t just specify how you in
fact update in response to the particular piece of evidence you actually receive.
Rather, they assume that your evidence between the earlier and later time will come
in the form of a proposition learned with certainty (Certain Evidence); they assume
the possible propositions that you might learn with certainty by the later time form a
partition (Evidential Partition); and they assume that each of the propositions you
might learn with certainty is one about which you had a prior opinion (Evidential
Availability); and then they specify, for each of the possible pieces of evidence in
your evidential partition, how you might update if you were to receive it.
Some philosophers, like Lewis (1999), assume that all three of these assumptions—
Certain Evidence, Evidential Partition, and Evidential Availability—hold in all
learning situations. Others deny one or more. For instance, Jeffrey (1992) denies
Certain Evidence and Evidential Availability; Konek (2019) denies Evidential
Availability but not Certain Evidence; van Fraassen (1999), Schoenfield (2017), and
R. Pettigrew
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Weisberg (2007) deny Evidential Partition. But all agree, I think, that there are certain
important situations when all three assumptions are true; there are certain situations
where there is a set of propositions that forms a partition and about each member of
which you have a prior opinion, and the possible evidence you might receive at the
later time comes in the form of one of these propositions learned with certainty.
Examples might include: when you are about to discover the outcome of a scientific
experiment, perhaps by taking a reading from a measuring device with unambiguous
outputs; when you’ve asked an expert a yes/no question; when you step on the digital
scales in your bathroom or check your bank balance or count the number of spots on the
back of the ladybird that just landed on your hand. So, if you disagree with Lewis,
simply restrict your attention to these cases in what follows.
As we will see, we can piggyback on conclusions about plans and dispositions to
produce arguments about actual behaviour in certain situations. But in the first
instance, I will take the arguments to address plans and dispositions defined on
evidential partitions primarily, and actual behaviour only secondarily. Thus, to state
these arguments, I need a clear way to represent updating plans or dispositions. I
will talk neutrally here of an updating rule. If you think Conditionalization governs
your updating dispositions, then you take it to govern the updating rule that matches
those dispositions; if you think it governs your updating intentions, then you take it
to govern the updating rule you intend to follow.
I’ll introduce a slew of terminology here. You needn’t take it all in at the
moment, but it’s worth keeping it all in one place for ease of reference.
Agenda I will assume that your prior and posterior credence functions are defined
on the same set of propositions F , and I’ll assume that F is finite and F is an
algebra. We say that F is your agenda.
Possible worlds Given an agenda F , the set of possible worlds relative to F is the
set of classically consistent assignments of truth values to the propositions in F . I’ll
abuse notation throughout and write w for (i) a truth value assignment to the
propositions in F , (ii) the proposition in F that is true at that truth value assignment
and only at that truth value assignment, and (iii) what we might call the omniscient
credence function relative to that truth value assignment, which is the credence
function that assigns maximal credence (i.e. 1) to all propositions that are true on it
and minimal credence (i.e. 0) to all propositions that are false on it.
Updating rules An updating rule has two components:
(i) a set of propositions, E ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng
this contains the propositions that you might learn with certainty at the later
time t0; each Ei is in F , so E  F ; E forms a partition;
(ii) a set of finite sets of credence functions, C ¼ fC1; . . .;Cng
for each Ei, Ci is the set of possible ways that the rule allows you to respond
to evidence Ei; that is, it is the set of possible posteriors that the rule permits
when you learn Ei; each c
0 in Ci in C is defined on F .4
4 For ease of exposition, I’ll assume throughout that each Ci contains only finitely many credence
functions. Similar results hold if we lift this restriction, but their proofs are more involved and these
stronger results aren’t needed to make our central point here.
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Deterministic updating rule An updating rule R ¼ ðE; CÞ is deterministic if each Ci
is a singleton set fcig. That is, for each piece of evidence there is exactly one
possible response to it that the rule allows.
Stochastic updating rule A stochastic updating rule is an updating rule R ¼
ðE; CÞ equipped with a probability function P. P records, for each Ei in E and c0 in
Ci, how likely it is that I will adopt c
0 in response to learning Ei. I write this
PðRic0 jEiÞ, where Ric0 is the proposition that says that you adopt posterior c0 in
response to evidence Ei.
• I assume PðRic0 jEiÞ[ 0 for all c0 in Ci. If the probability that you will adopt c0 in
response to Ei is zero, then c
0 does not count as a response to Ei that the rule
allows.
• Note that every deterministic updating rule is a stochastic updating rule for
which PðRic0 jEiÞ ¼ 1 for each c0 in Ci. If R ¼ ðE; CÞ is deterministic, then, for
each Ei, Ci ¼ fcig. So let PðRici jEiÞ ¼ 1.
Conditionalizing updating rule Suppose R ¼ ðE; CÞ is an updating rule. Then R is a
weak conditionalizing rule for a prior c if, whenever cðEiÞ[ 0, Ci ¼ fcig and
ciðÞ ¼ cðjEiÞ. And R is a strong conditionalizing rule for c if, for all cðEiÞ,
cðEiÞ[ 0, Ci ¼ fcig and ciðÞ ¼ cðjEiÞ5
Conditionalizing pairs A pair hc;Ri of a prior and an updating rule is a weak
(strong) conditionalizing pair if R is a weak (strong) conditionalizing rule for c.
Super-conditionalizing updating rule Suppose R ¼ ðE; CÞ is an updating rule.
Then let F be the smallest algebra that contains all of F and also Ric0 for each Ei in
E and c0 in Ci. (As above Ric0 is the proposition that says that you adopt posterior c0
in response to evidence Ei.) Then
(a) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c of c
such that, for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci, if cðRic0 Þ[ 0, then c0ðÞ ¼ cðjRic0 Þ.
That is, each posterior to which you assign positive prior credence is the
result of conditionalizing the extended prior c on the evidence to which it is a
response and the fact that it was your response to this evidence.
(b) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c of c
such that, for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci, cðRic0 Þ[ 0 and c0ðÞ ¼ cðjRic0 Þ.
That is, you assign positive prior credence to each posterior and each
posterior is the result of conditionalizing the extended prior c on the
evidence to which it is a response and the fact that it was your response to this
evidence.
Super-conditionalizing pair A pair hc;Ri of a prior and an updating rule is a weak
(strong) super-conditionalizing pair if R is a weak (strong) super-conditionalizing
rule for c.
Let’s illustrate these definitions using an example. Condi is a meteorologist.
There is a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. She knows that it will make landfall
5 Note that a conditionalizing rule for a prior need not be a deterministic updating rule. It need only be
deterministic for those possible pieces of evidence to which the prior assigns positive credence.
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soon in one of the following four towns: Pensacola, FL, Panama City, FL, Mobile,
AL, Biloxi, MS. She calls a friend and asks whether it has hit yet. It has. Then she
asks whether it has hit in Florida. At this point, the evidence she will receive when
her friend answers is either F—which says that it made landfall in Florida, that is, in
Pensacola or Panama City—or F—which says it hit elsewhere, that is, in Mobile or
Biloxi. Her prior is c:
Panama
City
Pensacola Mobile Biloxi
c 60% 20% 15% 5%
Her evidential partition is
E ¼ fF ¼ Pensacola _ PanamaCity;F ¼ Mobile _ Biloxig
And here are some posteriors she might adopt:
Panama City Pensacola Mobile Biloxi
c0F 75% 25% 0% 0%
c0
F
0% 0% 75% 25%
cF 70% 30% 0% 0%
c
F
0% 0% 70% 30%
c
y
F
80% 20% 0% 0%
c
y
F
0% 0% 80% 20%
And here are four possible rules she might adopt, along with their properties:
F F Det. Cond. W./S. super-cond.
R1 fc0Fg fc0Fg U U U
R2 fcFg fcFg U  
R3 fcF; cyFg fcF ; c
y
F
g   U
R4 fcFg fc
F
; c
y
F
g   
We’ll see in detail below why R3 is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, but
roughly speaking the reason is that it has two properties that are jointly sufficient for
being such a rule, as Lemma 2 shows: first, each posterior that R3 permits assigns
maximum credence to the evidence to which it is a response; second, c is a weighted
average of those permitted posteriors in which the weights are all positive.
As we will see below, for each of our four arguments for Conditionalization—
DSA, EPUA, EEUA, and EUDA—the standard formulation of the argument
assumes a norm that I call Deterministic Updating:
Deterministic updating (DU) Your updating rule should be deterministic.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?
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In what follows, I will present each argument in its standard formulation, which
assumes Deterministic Updating. Then I will explore what happens when we
remove that assumption.
3 The Dutch strategy argument (DSA)
The DSA and EPUA both evaluate updating rules by considering their pragmatic
consequences. That is, they look to the choices that your priors and/or your possible
posteriors lead you to make and they conclude that they are optimal only if your
updating rule is a conditionalizing rule for your prior.
3.1 DSA with deterministic updating
Let’s look at the DSA first. In what follows, I’ll take a decision problem to be a set
of options that are available to an agent: e.g. accept a particular bet or refuse it; buy
a particular lottery ticket or don’t; take an umbrella when you go outside, take a
raincoat, or take neither; and so on. The idea behind the DSA is this. One of the
roles of credences is to help us make choices when faced with decision problems.
They play that role badly if they lead us to make one series of choices when another
series is guaranteed to serve our ends better. The DSA turns on the claim that, unless
we update in line with Conditionalization, our credences will lead us to make such a
series of choices when faced with a particular series of decision problems.
Here, I restrict attention to a particular class of decision problems you might face.
They are the decision problems in which, for each available option, its outcome at a
given possible world obtains for you a certain amount of a particular quantity, such
as money or chocolate or pure pleasure, and your utility is linear in that quantity—
that is, obtaining some amount of that quantity increases your utility by the same
amount regardless of how much of the quantity you already have. The quantity is
typically taken to be money, and I’ll continue to talk like that in what follows. But
it’s really a placeholder for some quantity with this property. I restrict attention to
such decision problems because, in the argument, I need to combine the outcome of
one decision, made at the earlier time, with the outcome of another decision, made
at the later time. So I need to ensure that the utility of a combination of outcomes is
the sum of the utilities of the individual outcomes.
Now, suppose c is our prior and R ¼ ðE ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng; C ¼ fC1; . . .;CngÞ is our
updating rule. As I do throughout, I assume that c is a probability function, and so is
each c0 in Ci in C. And I will assume further that, when your credences are
probabilistic, and you face a decision problem, then you should choose from the
available options one that maximises expected utility relative to your credences.
With this in hand, let’s define two closely related features of a pair hc;Ri that are
undesirable from a pragmatic point of view, and might be thought to render that pair
irrational. First:
Strong Dutch strategies hc;Ri is vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy if
there are two decision problems, d and d0, such that
R. Pettigrew
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(i) c requires you to choose option A from the possible options available in d;
(ii) for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, c0 requires you to choose X from d0;
(iii) there are alternative options, B in d and Y in d0, such that, at every
possible world, you’ll receive more utility from choosing B and Y than
you receive from choosing A and X. In the language of decision theory,
Bþ Y strongly dominates Aþ X.
Weak Dutch strategies hc;Ri is vulnerable to a weak Dutch strategy if there
is a decision problem d and, for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, a further decision
problem dic0 such that
(i) c requires you to choose A from d;
(ii) for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, c0 requires you to choose Xic0 from dic0 ;
(iii) there is an alternative option, B in d, and, for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci,
there is an alternative option, Yic0 in d
i
c0 , such that (a) for each Ei, each
world in Ei, and each c
0 in Ci, you’ll receive at least as much utility at
that world from choosing B and Yic0 as you’ll receive from choosing A
and Xic0 , and (b) for some Ei, some world in Ei, and some c
0 in Ci, you’ll
receive strictly more utility at that world from B and Yic0 than you’ll
receive from A and Xic0 .
Then the Dutch strategy argument is based on the following mathematical fact
(de Finetti 1974):
Theorem 1 Suppose R is a deterministic updating rule. Then:
(i) If R is not a weak or strong conditionalizing pair for c , then hc;Ri is
vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy;
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, then hc;Ri is not vulnerable even to a
weak Dutch strategy.
(iii) If R is a weak conditionalizing rule for c, then hc;Ri is not vulnerable to a
strong Dutch strategy.
That is, if your updating rule is not a conditionalizing rule for your prior, then
your credences will lead you to choose a strongly dominated pair of options when
faced with a particular pair of decision problems; if it is, that can’t happen.
Now that we have seen how the argument works, let’s see whether it supports the
three versions of Conditionalization that we met above: Actual (AC), Plan (PC), and
Dispositional (DC) Conditionalization. Since they speak directly of rules, let’s begin
with PC and DC.
The DSA shows that, if you endorse a deterministic rule that isn’t a conditionalizing
rule for your prior, then there is pair of decision problems, one that you’ll face at the
earlier time and the other at the later time, where your credences at the earlier time and
your planned credences at the later time will require you to choose a dominated pair of
options. And it seems reasonable to say that it is irrational to endorse a plan when you
will be rendered vulnerable to a Dutch strategy if you follow through on it. So, for those
who endorse deterministic rules, DSA plausibly supports Plan Conditionalization.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?
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The same is true of Dispositional Conditionalization. Just as it is irrational to plan
to update in a way that would render you vulnerable to a Dutch strategy if you were
to stick to the plan, it is surely irrational to be disposed to update in a way that will
render you vulnerable in this way. So, for those whose updating dispositions are
deterministic, DSA plausibly supports Dispositional Conditionalization.
Finally, AC. There are various different ways to move from either PC or DC to
AC, but each one of them requires some extra assumptions. For instance:
1. I might assume: (i) between an earlier and a later time, there is always a
partition such that you know that the strongest evidence you will receive
between those times is a proposition from that partition learned with certainty;
(ii) if you know you’ll receive evidence from some partition, you are rationally
required to plan how you will update on each possible piece of evidence before
you receive it; and (iii) if you plan how to respond to evidence before you
receive it, you are rationally required to follow through on that plan once you
have received it. Together with PC, these give AC.
This is the most common route to AC, and has therefore received the most
attention. Schoenfield (2017), Weisberg (2007), van Fraassen (1999), and
Bronfman (2014) deny (i); van Fraassen (1989) denies (ii); and Pettigrew
(2016) denies (iii).
2. I might assume: (i) you have updating dispositions. So, if you actually update
other than by Conditionalization, then it must be a manifestation of a
disposition other than conditionalizing. Together with DC, this gives AC.
3. I might assume: (i) that you are rationally required to update in any way that can
be represented as the result of updating on a plan that you were rationally
permitted to endorse or as the result of dispositions that you were rationally
permitted to have, even if you did not in fact endorse any plan prior to receiving
the evidence nor have any updating dispositions. Again, together with PC ? DU
or DC, this gives AC.
3.2 DSA without deterministic updating
We have now seen how the DSA proceeds if we assume Deterministic Updating.
But what if we don’t? Consider, for instance, rule R3 from our list of examples at the
end of Sect. 2 above, where I described Condi’s credences concerning the landfall
of a hurricane:
R3 ¼ ðE ¼ fF;Fg; C ¼ fCF ¼ fcF ; cyFg;CF ¼ fcF ; c
y
F
ggÞ
That is, if Condi learns F, rule R3 allows her to update from her prior c to posterior
cF or posterior c
y
F . And if she receives F, it allows her to update to c

F
or to c
y
F
.
Notice that hc;R3i violates Conditionalization thoroughly: it is not deterministic;
and, moreover, as well as not mandating the posteriors that Conditionalization
R. Pettigrew
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demands, it does not even permit them. The posterior cðjFÞ does not appear in CF
and cðjFÞ does not appear in CF . Can we adapt the DSA to show that R3 is
irrational for someone with prior c? As we’ll see, the answer is no. The reason is
that hc;R3i is not vulnerable to a Dutch strategy.
To see this, I first note that, while R3 is not deterministic and not a
conditionalizing rule for c, it is a super-conditionalizing rule for c. And to see
that, it helps to state the following representation theorem for super-conditionalizing
rules, which we mentioned informally above:
Lemma 2
(i) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E and
c0 in Ci; 0 kic0  1 with
P
Ei2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0 ¼ 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci , if kic0 [ 0 , then c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1 , and
(b) cðÞ ¼PEi2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0c
0ðÞ.
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E
and c0 in Ci; 0\kic0\1 with
P
Ei2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0 ¼ 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci; c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1 ; and
(b) cðÞ ¼PEi2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0c
0ðÞ.
Now note:
(a) cFðFÞ ¼ 1 ¼ cyFðFÞ and cFðFÞ ¼ 1 ¼ c
y
F
ðFÞ
(b) cðÞ ¼ 0:4cFðÞ þ 0:4cyFðÞ þ 0:1cFðÞ þ 0:1c
y
F
ðÞ
So R3 is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c. What’s more:
Theorem 3
(i) If R is not a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then hc;Ri is
vulnerable at least to a weak Dutch strategy, and possibly also a strong
Dutch strategy.
(ii) If R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c , then hc;Ri is not
vulnerable to a weak Dutch strategy.
(iii) If R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c , then hc;Ri is not
vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy.
Thus, by Theorem 3(ii), hc;R3i is not vulnerable even to a weak Dutch strategy.
The DSA, then, cannot say what is irrational about Condi if she begins with prior c
and either endorses R3 as an updating plan or is disposed to update in line with it.
Thus, the DSA cannot justify Deterministic Updating. And without DU, it cannot
support PC or DC either. After all, R3 violates each of those, but it is not vulnerable
even to a weak Dutch strategy. And moreover, each of the three arguments for AC
break down because they depend on PC or DC. The problem is that, if Condi
updates from c to cF upon learning F, she violates AC; but there is an updating
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rule—namely, R3—that allows c

F as a response to learning F, and, for all DSA tells
us, she might have rationally endorsed R3 before learning F or she might rationally
have been disposed to follow it. Indeed, the only restriction that DSA can place on
your actual updating behaviour is that you should become certain of the evidence
that you learned. After all:
Theorem 4 Suppose c is your prior and c0 is your posterior. Then, providing
c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1 , there is a rule R such that:
(i) c0 is in Ci, and
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c.
Thus, at the end of this section, we can conclude that, whatever is irrational about
planning to update using non-deterministic updating rules that are nonetheless
strong super-conditionalizing rules for your prior, it cannot be that following
through on those plans leaves you vulnerable to a Dutch strategy, for it does not.
And similarly, whatever is irrational about being disposed to update in those ways, it
cannot be that those dispositions will equip you with credences that lead you to
choose dominated options, for they do not. With PC and DC thus blocked, our route
to AC is therefore also blocked.
4 The expected pragmatic utility argument (EPUA)
Let’s look at EPUA next. Again, I will consider how our credences guide our
actions when we face decision problems. In this case, there is no need to restrict
attention to monetary decision problems. I will only consider a single decision
problem, which we face at the later time, after we’ve received the evidence, so I
won’t have to combine the outcomes of multiple options as I did in the DSA. The
idea is this. Suppose you will make a decision after you receive whatever evidence it
is that you receive at the later time. And suppose that you will use your later updated
credence function to make that choice—indeed, you’ll choose from the available
options by maximising expected utility from the point of view of your new updated
credences. Which updating rules does your prior expect will lead you to make the
choice best?
4.1 EPUA with deterministic updating
Suppose you’ll face decision problem d after you’ve updated. And suppose further
that you’ll use a deterministic updating rule R. Then, if w is a possible world and Ei
is the element of the evidential partition E that is true at w, the idea is that we take
the pragmatic utility of R relative to d at w to be the utility at w of whatever option
from d we should choose if our posterior credence function were ci, as R requires it
to be at w. But of course, for many decision problems, this isn’t well defined
because there isn’t a unique option in d that maximises expected utility by the lights
of ci; rather there are sometimes many such options, and they might have different
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utilities at w. Thus, we need not only ci but also a selection function, which picks a
single option from any set of options. If f is such a selection function, then let Adci;f
be the option that f selects from the set of options in d that maximise expected utility
by the lights of ci. And let
ud;f ðR;wÞ ¼ uðAdci;f ;wÞ:
Then the EPUA argument turns on the following mathematical fact (Savage 1954;
Good 1967; Brown 1976):
Theorem 5 Suppose R and RH are both deterministic updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and RH are both conditionalizing rules for c, and f, g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and RH is not, and f, g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
with strict inequality for some decision problems d.
That is, a deterministic updating rule maximises expected pragmatic utility by the
lights of your prior just in case it is a conditionalizing rule for your prior.
As in the case of the DSA above, then, if we assume Deterministic Updating
(DU), we can establish PC and DC. On the back of those, we can establish AC as
well, using one of the arguments from the end of Sect. 3.1. After all, it is surely
irrational to plan to update in one way when you expect another way to guide your
actions better in the future; and it is surely irrational to be disposed to update in one
way when you expect another to guide you better. And as before there are the same
three arguments for AC on the back of PC and DC.
4.2 EPUA without deterministic updating
How does EPUA fare when we widen our view to include non-deterministic
updating rules as well? The problem is that it is not clear how to define the
pragmatic utility of such an updating rule relative to a decision problem and
selection function at a possible world. Above, I said that, relative to a decision
problem d and a selection function f, the pragmatic utility of rule R at world w is the
utility of the option that you would choose when faced with d using the credence
function that R mandates at w and f: that is, if Ei is true at w, then
ud;f ðR;wÞ ¼ uðAdci;f ;wÞ:
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But, if R is not deterministic, there might be no single credence function that it
mandates at w. If Ei is the piece of evidence you’ll learn at w and R permits more
than one credence function in response to Ei, then there might be a range of different
options in d, each of which maximises expected utility relative to a different cre-
dence function in Ci. So what are we to do?
There are (at least) two possibilities: the fine-graining response and the coarse-
graining response. On the former, we cannot establish PC or DC without assuming
DU; on the latter, we can.
Let’s begin with the former. When we notice that there might be no single
credence function that your rule R mandates at world w, a natural response is to say
that we should specify the worlds in more detail, so that they determine not only the
truth or falsity of the propositions in F , but also which credence function you in fact
adopt from those that R permits. In fact, given that we will be comparing the
expected pragmatic utility of two different updating rules, R and RH, we need
worlds that specify not only a credence function that someone following R adopts
but also a credence function that someone following RH adopts. If w is in Ei, c
0 is in
Ci, and c
H0 is in CHi , then let w & R
i
c0 & R
Hi
cH0 be the world at which the propositions
in F that are true at w are true, the propositions in F that are false at w are false, the
person with rule R adopts c0 in response to receiving evidence Ei and the person with
RH adopts cH0 in response to that evidence. And define the pragmatic utilities of R
and RH at this world relative to a decision problem d and a selection function f in the
natural way:
• ud;f ðR;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ ¼ uðAdc0;f ;wÞ
• ud;f ðRH;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ ¼ uðAdcH0;f ;wÞ
The problem, of course, is that, in the EPUA, we wish to calculate the expected
pragmatic utility of an updating rule from the point of view of the prior. And that’s
possible only if the prior assigns a credence to each of the possible worlds. But,
while our assumption that F is a finite algebra guarantees that a prior defined on F
assigns a credence to each w in W, there is no guarantee that it assigns one to each
w & Ric0 & R
H0
cH0 . So what’s to be done?
A natural proposal is this: an updating rule R is rationally permissible from the
point of view of a prior c just in case there is some way to extend c to c such that R
maximises expected pragmatic utility by the lights of the extended prior, c.
However, it is straightforward to see that any super-conditionalizing rule for a prior
is rationally permissible by this standard. After all, if R is a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing rule for c, then there is an extension of c such that R is a
conditionalizing rule for c, and then we can piggyback on Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 Suppose R is an updating rule. Then, if R is a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing rule for c, then there is an extension c of c such that, for all
updating rules RH , for all selection functions f, g , and all decision problems d
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XEi2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02CH
i
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þud;f ðR;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ

X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02CH
i
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þud;gðRH;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
So, if we opt for the fine-graining response to the problem of defining the
pragmatic utility of a non-deterministic rule at a world, then we cannot establish
either PC or DC without assuming DU and restricting the set of permissible
updating rules to include only the deterministic ones.
But we might instead adopt the coarse-graining response. On this response, we
retain the original possible worlds w in W, and we define the pragmatic utility of a
rule at a world as either the expectation or the average of its pragmatic utility,
depending on whether we are thinking of the rule as representing our dispositions or
our plans, and thus whether we aim to establish DC or PC.
Suppose, first, that we are interested in DC. That is, we are interested in a norm
that governs the updating rule that records how you are disposed to update when you
receive certain evidence. Then it seems reasonable to assume that the updating rule
that records your dispositions is stochastic. That is, for each possible piece of
evidence Ei and each possible response c
0 in Ci to that evidence that you might
adopt, there is some objective chance that you will respond to Ei by adopting c
0. As I
explained above, I’ll write this PðRic0 jEiÞ, where Ric0 is the proposition that you
receive Ei and respond by adopting c
0. Then, if Ei is true at w, we might take the
pragmatic utility of R relative to d and f at w to be the expectation of the utility of
the options that each permitted response to Ei (and selection function f) would lead
us to choose:6
ud;f ðR;wÞ ¼
X
c02Ci
PðRic0 jEiÞuðAdc0;f ;wÞ
With this in hand, we have the following result:
Theorem 7 Suppose R and RH are both updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and RH are both conditionalizing rules for c, and f, g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
(ii) R is a conditionalizing rule for c, and RH is a stochastic but not
conditionalizing rule, and f, g are selection functions, then for all decision
problems d,
6 Recall: we assumed that each Ci is finite, so this is well-defined.
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Xw2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
with strictly inequality for some decision problems d.
This shows the first difference between the DSA and EPUA. The latter, but not
the former, provides a route to establishing Dispositional Conditionalization (DC).
If we adopt the coarse-graining response to the problem of defining the pragmatic
utility of an updating rule, we can establish DC. If we assume that your dispositions
are governed by a chance function, and we use that chance function to calculate
expectations, then we can show that your prior will expect your posteriors to do
worse as a guide to action unless you are disposed to update by conditionalizing on
the evidence you receive.
Next, suppose we are interested in Plan Conditionalization (PC). In this case, we
might try to appeal again to Theorem 7. To do that, we must assume that, while
there are non-deterministic updating rules that we might endorse, they are all at least
stochastic updating rules; that is, they all come equipped with a probability function
that determines how likely it is that I will adopt a particular permitted response to
the evidence I receive. That is, we might say that the updating rules that we might
endorse are either deterministic or non-deterministic-but-stochastic. In the language
of game theory, we might say that the updating strategies between which we choose
are either pure or mixed. And then Theorem 7 will show that we should adopt a
deterministic-and-conditionalizing rule, rather than any deterministic-but-non-
conditionalizing or non-deterministic-but-stochastic rule. The problem with this
proposal is that it seems just as arbitrary to restrict to deterministic and non-
deterministic-but-stochastic rules as it was to restrict to deterministic rules in the
first place. Why should we not be able to endorse a non-deterministic and non-
stochastic rule—that is, a rule that says, for at least one possible piece of evidence Ei
in E, there are two or more posteriors that the rule permits as responses, but does not
endorse any chance mechanism by which we’ll choose between them? But if we
permit these rules, how are we to define their pragmatic utility relative to a decision
problem and at a possible world?
Here’s one suggestion. Suppose Ei is the proposition in E that is true at world w.
And suppose d is a decision problem and f is a selection rule. Then we might take
the pragmatic utility of R relative to d and f and at w to be the average (specifically,
the mean) utility of the options that each permissible response to Ei and f would
choose when faced with d. That is,
ud;f ðR;wÞ ¼ 1jCij
X
c02Ci
uðAdc0;f ;wÞ
where jCij is the size of Ci, that is, the number of possible responses to Ei that
R permits.7 If that’s the case, then we have the following:
7 Again, recall that each Ci is finite, so this is well-defined.
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Theorem 8 Suppose R and RH are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionalizing
rule for c, and RH is not deterministic, not stochastic, and not a conditionalizing
rule for c, and f, g are selection functions, then for all decision problems d,
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðRH;wÞ
with strictly inequality for some decision problems d.
Put together with Theorems 5 and 7, this shows that our prior expects us to do
better by endorsing a conditionalizing rule than by endorsing any other sort of rule,
whether that is a deterministic and non-conditionalizing rule, a non-deterministic
but stochastic rule, or a non-deterministic and non-stochastic rule.
So, again, we see a difference between DSA and EPUA. Just as the latter, but not
the former, provides a route to establishing DC without assuming Deterministic
Updating, so the latter but not the former provides a route to establishing PC without
DU. And from both of those, we have the usual three routes to AC enumerated at the
end of Sect. 3.1. This means that, if we respond to the problem of defining
pragmatic utility by taking the coarse-graining appoach, the EPUA could explain
what’s irrational about endorsing a non-deterministic updating rule, or having
dispositions that match one. If you do, there’s some alternative updating rule that
your prior expects to do better as a guide to future action.
5 Expected epistemic utility argument (EEUA)
The previous two arguments criticized non-conditionalizing updating rules from the
standpoint of pragmatic utility. The EEUA and EUDA both criticize such rules from
the standpoint of epistemic utility. The idea is this: just as credences play a
pragmatic role in guiding our actions, so they play other roles as well—they
represent the world; they respond to evidence; they might combine more or less
coherently. These roles are purely epistemic, and so just as I defined the pragmatic
utility of a credence function at a world when faced with a decision problem, so we
can also define the epistemic utility of a credence function at a world—it is a
measure of how valuable it is to have that credence function from a purely epistemic
point of view.
5.1 EEUA with deterministic updating
I won’t give an explicit definition of the epistemic utility of a credence function at a
world. Rather, I’ll simply state two properties that I’ll take measures of such
epistemic utility to have. These are widely assumed in the literature on epistemic
utility theory and accuracy-first epistemology, and I’ll defer to the arguments in
favour of them that are outlined there (Joyce 2009; Pettigrew 2016; Horowitz 2019).
A local epistemic utility function is a function s that takes a single credence and a
truth value—either true (1) or false (0)—and returns the epistemic value of having
that credence in a proposition with that truth value. Thus, s(1, p) is the epistemic
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value of having credence p in a truth, while s(0, p) is the epistemic value of having
credence p in a falsehood. A global epistemic utility function is a function EU that
takes an entire credence function defined on F and a possible world and returns the
epistemic value of having that credence function when the propositions in F have
the truth values they have in that world.
Strict propriety A local epistemic utility function s is strictly proper if
(i) s(1, x) and s(0, x) are continuous functions of x;
(ii) each credence expects itself and only itself to have the greatest epistemic
utility. That is, for all 0 p 1,
psð1; xÞ þ ð1  pÞsð0; xÞ
is uniquely maximised, as a function of x, at x ¼ p.8
Additivity A global epistemic utility function is additive if, for each
proposition X in F , there is a local epistemic utility function sX such that
the epistemic utility of a credence function c at a possible world is the sum of
the epistemic utilities at that world of the credences it assigns. If w is a
possible world and we write w(X) for the truth value (0 or 1) of proposition X
at w, this says:
EUðc;wÞ ¼
X
X2F
sXðwðXÞ; cðXÞÞ
We can then define the epistemic utility of a deterministic updating rule R in the
same way we defined its pragmatic utility above: if Ei is true at w, and Ci ¼ fcig,
then
EUðR;wÞ ¼ EUðci;wÞ
Then the standard formulation of the EEUA turns on the following theorem
(Greaves and Wallace 2006):
Theorem 9 Suppose R and RH are deterministic updating rules. Then:
(i) If R and RH are both conditionalizing rules for c , then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c and RH is not, then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ[
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
8 That is, if p 6¼ q, then
psð1; pÞ þ ð1  pÞsð0; pÞ[ psð1; qÞ þ ð1  pÞsð0; qÞ
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That is, a deterministic updating rule maximises expected epistemic utility by the
lights of your prior just in case it is a conditionalizing rule for your prior.
So, as for DSA and EPUA, if we assume Deterministic Updating, we obtain an
argument for PC and DC, and indirectly arguments for AC too.
5.2 EEUA without deterministic updating
If we don’t assume Deterministic Updating, the situation here is very similar to the
one we encountered above when we considered EPUA. Suppose R is a non-
deterministic updating rule. Then again we have two choices: the fine- and the
coarse-graining response.
On the fine-graining response, the epistemic utility of R at a fine-grained world is
EUðR;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ ¼ EUðc0;wÞ
In this case, as with EPUA, we have:
Theorem 10 Suppose R and RH are both updating rules. Then, if R is a weak or
strong super-conditionalizing rule for c , then there is an extension c of c such that
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02CH
i
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 ÞEUðR;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ

X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02CH
i
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 ÞEUðRH;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
So it seems that super-conditionalizing updating rules are rationally permissible,
at least by the lights of expected epistemic utility.
Next, the coarse-graining response. Suppose R is non-deterministic but stochas-
tic. Then we let its epistemic utility at a coarse-grained world be the expectation of
the epistemic utility that the various possible posteriors permitted by R take at that
world. That is, if Ei is the proposition in E that is true at w, then
EUðR;wÞ ¼
X
c02Ci
PðRic0 jEiÞEUðc0;wÞ
Then, we have a similar result to Theorem 7:
Theorem 11 Suppose R and RH are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionalizing
rule for c , and RH is stochastic but not a conditionalizing rule for c , then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ[
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
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Next, suppose R is a non-deterministic but also a non-stochastic rule. Then we let
its epistemic utility at a world be the average epistemic utility that the various
possible posteriors permitted by R take at that world. That is, if Ei is the proposition
in F that is true at w, then
EUðR;wÞ ¼ 1jCij
X
c02Ci
EUðc0;wÞ
And again we have a similar result to Theorem 8:
Theorem 12 Suppose R and RH are updating rules. Then if R is a conditionalizing
rule for c , and RH is not deterministic, not stochastic, and not a conditionalizing
rule for c . Then:
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ[
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
So the situation is the same as for EPUA. If we take the coarse-graining
approach, whether we assess a rule by looking at how well the posteriors it produces
guide our future actions or how good they are from a purely epistemic point of view,
our prior will expect a conditionalizing rule for itself to be better than any non-
conditionalizing rule. And thus we obtain PC and DC, and indirectly AC as well.
6 Epistemic utility dominance argument (EUDA)
Finally, I turn to the EUDA. In EPUA and EEUA, we assess the pragmatic or
epistemic utility of the updating rule from the viewpoint of the prior. In DSA, we
assess the prior and updating rule together, and from no particular point of view;
and, unlike the EPUA and EEUA, we do not assign utilities, either pragmatic or
epistemic, to the prior and the rule. In EUDA, like in DSA and unlike EPUA and
EEUA, we assess the prior and updating rule together, and again from no particular
point of view; but, unlike in DSA and like in EPUA and EEUA, we assign utilities
to them—in particular, epistemic utilities—and assess them with reference to those.
6.1 EUDA with deterministic updating
Suppose R is a deterministic updating rule. Then, as before, if Ei is true at w, let the
epistemic utility of R be the epistemic utility of the credence function ci that it
mandates at w: that is,
EUðR;wÞ ¼ EUðci;wÞ;
But this time also let the epistemic utility of the pair hc;Ri consisting of the prior
and the updating rule be the sum of the epistemic utility of the prior and the
epistemic utility of the updating rule: that is,
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EUðhc;Ri;wÞ ¼ EUðc;wÞ þ EUðR;wÞ ¼ EUðc;wÞ þ EUðci;wÞ
Then the EUDA turns on the following mathematical fact (Briggs and Pettigrew
2018):
Theorem 13 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
And suppose R and RH are deterministic updating rules. Then:
(i) If hc;Ri is not conditionalizing, there is hcH;RHi such that, for all w,
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞÞ
(ii) If hc;Ri is conditionalizing, there is no hcH;RHi such that, for all w,
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞÞ
That is, if R is not a conditionalizing rule for c, then together they are EU-
dominated; if it is a conditionalizing rule, they are not. Thus, like EPUA, EEUA, and
DSA, if we assume Deterministic Updating, EUDA gives PC, DC, and indirectly AC.
6.2 EUDA without deterministic updating
Now suppose we permit non-deterministic updating rules as well as deterministic
ones. As before, there are two approaches: the fine- and coarse-graining approaches.
Here is the relevant result for the fine-graining approach:
Theorem 14 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then:
(i) If R is a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, there is no
hcH;RHi such that, for all Ei in E;w in Ei; c0 in Ci and cH0 in CHi
EUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ\EUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
(ii) There are rules R that are not weak or strong super-conditionalizing rules
for c such that there is no hcH;RHi such that, for all Ei in E;w in Ei; c0 in Ci
and cH0 in CHi
EUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ\EUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
Interpreted in this way, then, and without the assumption of Deterministic
Updating, EUDA is the weakest of all the arguments. Whereas DSA at least
establishes that your updating rule should be a weak or strong super-conditional-
izing for your prior, even if it does not establish that it should be conditionalizing,
EUDA does not establish even that.
And here is the relevant result for the coarse-graining approach:
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Theorem 15 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then, if hc;Ri is not a conditionalizing pair, there is an alternative pair hcH;RHi
such that, for all w,
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞ
This therefore supports an argument for PC and DC and indirectly AC as well.
7 Conclusion
One upshot of this investigation is that, so long as we assume Deterministic
Updating (DU), all four arguments support the same conclusions, namely, Plan (PC)
and Dispositional (DC) Conditionalization, and also Actual Conditionalization
(AC). But once we drop DU, that agreement vanishes.
Without DU, DSA shows only that, if we plan to update using a particular rule, it
should be a super-conditionalizating rule for our prior; and similarly for our
dispositions. As a result, it cannot support AC. Indeed, it can support only the
weakest restrictions on our actual updating behaviour, since nearly any such
behaviour can be seen as an implementation of a super-conditionalizing rule—as
long as we become certain of the evidence we receive after we receive it, we can be
represented as having followed a strong super-conditionalizing rule.
EPUA, EEUA, and EUDA are more hopeful, at least if we adopt the coarse-
graining response to the question of how to define the pragmatic or epistemic utility
of a non-deterministic updating rule at a world. Let’s consider our updating
dispositions first. It seems natural to assume that, even if these are not deterministic,
they are at least governed by objective chances. If so, and if we define the pragmatic
or epistemic utility of the rule that represents those dispositions to be the
expectation of the pragmatic or epistemic utility of the credence functions it
produces, then we obtain DC without assuming DU. That is, we can justify DU by
appealing to pragmatic or epistemic utility. However, if we use the fine-graining
response, this isn’t possible. And similarly when we consider our updating plans.
Here, if we use the coarse-graining response and define the pragmatic or epistemic
utility of the rule that represents our plan to be the average pragmatic or epistemic
utility of the credence functions it produces, then we obtain PC without assuming
DU. And again, if we use the fine-graining response, this isn’t possible. Indeed, if
we use the fine-graining approach, EPUA and EEUA establish only that you should
plan to update using a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule. And EUDA
doesn’t even establish that.
So, at least if we look just to our existing arguments for Conditionalization, the
fates of DC and PC seem to turn on making one of two responses. First, we might
simply assume Deterministic Updating. That is, to establish PC, we might simply
assume that we are rationally required to plan to update in a deterministic way; and,
to establish DC, we might assume that we are rationally required to have
deterministic updating dispositions. This doesn’t seem promising. Typically, those
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philosophers who offer one of the four arguments for Conditionalization studied
here do so precisely because we aren’t content to make brute normative assumptions
about how it is rational to update; we wish to know what is so good about updating
in the way that Conditionalization describes and what is so bad about updating in
some other way. Part of that is a desire to know what is so good about updating
deterministically and what is so bad about updating non-deterministically. As I
mentioned at the beginning, the four arguments considered here are teleological, so
they specifically tell you the goods that Conditionalization and deterministic
updating obtain for you. To simply assume DU is to leave the latter a mystery.
Second, we might take the coarse-graining response to the problem of defining
pragmatic and epistemic utility, and then appeal to EPUA, EEUA, or EUDA. This
seems more promising. That response certainly seems reasonable—that is, it
produces a reasonable way to define the pragmatic or epistemic utility of an
updating rule at a coarse-grained world. The problem is that we need to do more
than that if we are to establish DC and PC. It is not sufficient to show that the
coarse-graining response is reasonable and therefore permissible. We have to show
that it is mandatory. After all, if the fine- and the coarse-graining responses are both
permissible, then there is a permissible way of defining pragmatic and epistemic
utility on which non-conditionalizing updating rules are permissible. And that
suggests that those rules are themselves permissible. And that conflicts with DC and
PC. What is needed is an argument that the fine-graining response is not legitimate.
For myself, I don’t see what that might be.
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Appendix: Proofs
Recall:
(a) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c of c
such that, for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci, if cðRic0 Þ[ 0, then c0ðÞ ¼ cðjRic0 Þ.
(b) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c if there is an extension c of c
such that, for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci, cðRic0 Þ[ 0 and c0ðÞ ¼ cðjRic0 Þ.
Dutch strategy argument
Lemma 2
(i) R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E and
c0 in Ci, 0 kic0  1 with
P
Ei2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0 ¼ 1 such that
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(a) for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci , if kic0 [ 0 , then c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1 , and
(b) cðÞ ¼PEi2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0c
0ðÞ
(ii) R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c iff there is, for each Ei in E
and c0 in Ci, 0\kic0\1 with
P
Ei2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0 ¼ 1 such that
(a) for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci, c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1 ; and
(b) cðÞ ¼PEi2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0c
0ðÞ
Proof of Lemma 2 Let’s take (i) first. We’ll begin with the left-to-right direction.
Suppose R is a weak superconditionalizing rule for c. Then, if cðRic0 Þ[ 0, then
c0ðEiÞ ¼ cðEijRic0 Þ. But Ric0 says that you received evidence Ei and responded by
adopting credence function c0. So Ric0 entails Ei, and thus c
ðEijRic0 Þ ¼ 1. So
c0ðEiÞ ¼ 1. That gives (a).
Next, for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, let kic0 ¼ cðRic0 Þ. Now, for each Ei in E and c0
in Ci, and for each possible world w, we have c
ðw & Ric0 Þ ¼ cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞ. Thus:
cðwÞ ¼ cðwÞ since c extends c
¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 Þ by Finite Additivity of c
¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞ as noted above
¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
kic0c
0ðwÞ
as required. This gives (b).
Second, we take the right-to-left direction of (i). Suppose (a) and (b) hold. Then
there is, for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, 0 kic0  1 with
P
Ei2E
P
c02Ci k
i
c0 ¼ 1 such that
cðÞ ¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
kic0c
0ðÞ
So, given a possible world w, Ei in E, and c0 in Ci, let
cðw & Ric0 Þ ¼ kic0c0ðwÞ
Then
• For any possible world w,
cðwÞ ¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 Þ ¼
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
kic0c
0ðwÞ ¼ cðwÞ
So c is an extension of c.
• For any possible world w, Ei in E, and c0 in Ci, if cðRic0 Þ[ 0, then
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cðwjRic0 Þ ¼
cðw & Ric0 Þ
cðRic0 Þ
¼ k
i
c0c
0ðwÞ
P
w02W k
i
c0c
0ðw0Þ ¼
kic0c
0ðwÞ
kic0
P
w02W c0ðw0Þ
¼ c0ðwÞ
and thus c0ðEiÞ ¼ cðEijRic0 Þ ¼ 1.
Thus, R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c. This establishes Lemma 2(i).
The proof of Lemma 2(ii) proceeds in exactly the same way. h
Theorem 3
(i) If R is not a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c , then it is
vulnerable at least to a weak Dutch strategy, and possibly to a strong
Dutch strategy.
(ii) If R is a strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, then it is not vulnerable
even to a weak Dutch strategy.
(iii) If R is a weak super-conditionalizing rule for c, then \c, R[ is not
vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy.
Proof of Theorem 3 First, (i). Suppose R is not a weak or strong super-
conditionalizing rule for c. Then, by Lemma 2, either
(a) c0ðEiÞ\1 for some Ei in E and c0 in Ci; or
(b) c is not in the convex hull of the set of posteriors that R permits.9
Let’s take these in turn.
First, (a). Suppose that c0ðEiÞ\p\1 for some Ei in E and c0 in Ci. Then let Xic0 be an
option that has utilityð1  pÞ ifEi is true and p if not. And letYic0 be the option that has
utility 0 regardless. Then offer no decision problem at the earlier time and offer one at
the later time only if the agent learns Ei and adopts c
0; and in that situation, offer
dic0 ¼ fXic0 ; Yic0 g. Then the agent will choose Xic0 , but that will do worse than Yic0 at all
worlds at which Ei is true. So hc;Ri is vulnerable to a weak Dutch strategy.
Second, (b). Supposec is not in the convex hull of the set of posteriors thatRpermits. That
is, c is not in the convex hull of the set fc0 : ð9Ei 2 EÞðc0 2 CiÞg. Now, let’s represent
each credence function onF by the vector of the values that it takes the possible worlds
w in W. Thus, if W ¼ fw1; . . .;wmg, then we represent c by hcðw1Þ; . . .; cðwmÞi; and,
for any Ei in E and c0 in Ci, we represent c0 by hc0ðw1Þ; . . .; c0ðwmÞi. Now, since c is
outside the convex hull of the set of posteriors thatR permits, the vector that represents
c is outside the convex hull of the set of vectors that represent the posteriors that R
permits. Thus, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there is a vector S ¼
hS1; . . .; Smi such that, for any Ei in E and c0 in Ci,
c0 	 S\c 	 S
Then pick m, e such that c0 	 S\m e\m\c 	 S. Now let:
9 The convex hull of a set of points is the smallest convex set that contains it as a subset. A set is convex
if, for any two points in it, any convex combination of those two points also lies in the set.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?
123
• A be the option that has utility Si at world wi;
• B be the option that has utility m at world wi;
• B e be the option that has utility m e at world wi.
Then, let d ¼ fA;Bg. Your prior c will choose A, since the expected utility of A is
c 	 S, while the expected utility of B is m. And let d0 ¼ fA;B eg. Then each of
your possible posteriors c0 will choose B e, since the expected utility of A is c0 	 S,
while the expected utility of B e is m e. Choosing B from d and A from d0 is
guaranteed to have greater total utility than choosing A from d and B e from d0. So
hc;Ri is vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy. This establishes Theorem 3(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose there are decision problems d and dic0 for each Ei in E and c0
in Ci. And suppose d ¼ fA;Bg and dic0 ¼ fXic0 ; Yic0 g. Now suppose c would choose A
over B and, for each Ei in E and c0 in Ci, c0 would choose Xic0 over Yic0 . So:
(a)
P
w2W cðwÞuðA;wÞ[
P
w2W cðwÞuðB;wÞ
(b)
P
w2W c
0ðwÞuðXic0 ;wÞ[
P
w2W c
0ðwÞuðYic0 ;wÞ, for all Ei in E and c0 in Ci
Now, suppose that, for each Ei in E, w in Ei, and c0 in Ci,
uðA;wÞ þ uðXic0 ;wÞ\uðB;wÞ þ uðYic0 ;wÞ ðyÞ
Then
X
w2W
cðwÞuðA;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þ
X
w2W
c0ðwÞuðXic0 ;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞuðA;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞuðXic0 ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 ÞuðA;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 ÞuðXic0 ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 Þ½uðA;wÞ þ uðXic0 ;wÞ

\
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 Þ½uðB;wÞ þ uðYic0 ;wÞ
 by ðyÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 ÞuðB;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðw & Ric0 ÞuðYic0 ;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞuðB;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞuðYic0 ;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞuðB;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þ
X
w2W
c0ðwÞuðYic0 ;wÞ
But this contradicts (a) and (b). This establishes Theorem 3(ii). The proof of The-
orem 3(iii) proceeds in the same way. h
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Expected pragmatic utility argument
We first prove the following lemma. Theorems 5, 7, and 8 all follow as corollaries.
Lemma 16
(i) If R;RH are conditionalizing rules for c , and f, g are selection functions,
then for all decision problems d
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c , and RH is not, and f, g are selection
functions, then for all decision problems d,
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
with strict inequality for some decision problems d.
Proof First, (i). Suppose R and RH are conditionalizing rules for c, and f, g are
selection functions. So:
• R ¼ ðE ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng; C ¼ fC1; . . .;CngÞ and
• RH ¼ ðE ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng; C ¼ fCH1 ; . . .;CHn gÞ.
And, if cðEiÞ[ 0,
• Ci ¼ fcig and CHi ¼ fcHi g;
• ciðÞcðEiÞ ¼ cð & EiÞ ¼ cHi ðÞcðEiÞ;
• ciðÞ ¼ cðjEiÞ ¼ cHi ðÞ.
Suppose d is a decision problem. Then,
• If cðEiÞ[ 0, then ciðÞ ¼ cHi ðÞ, and thus
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cHi ðwÞuðAdcH
i
;g
;wÞ
so
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ ¼ cðEiÞ
X
w2W
cHi ðwÞuðAdcH
i
;g
;wÞ
• If cðEiÞ ¼ 0, then
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ ¼ 0 ¼ cðEiÞ
X
w2W
cHi ðwÞuðAdcH
i
;g
;wÞ
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So
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðEiÞciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
cHi ðwÞuðAdcH
i
;g
;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðEiÞcHi ðwÞuðAdcH
i
;g
;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞuðAd
cH
i
;g
;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
as required. This establishes Lemma 16(i). h
Second, (ii). Suppose R is a conditionalizing rule, and RH is not, and f, g are
selection functions. Then, if cðEiÞ[ 0, then Ci ¼ fcig, ciðEiÞ ¼ 1, and
cðwÞ ¼ ciðwÞcðEiÞ. Now, suppose that, for each Ei in E and c0 in CHi , there is
aic0 [ 0 such that for each Ei in E,
P
c02CH
i
aic0 ¼ 1 and
ud;f ðRH;wÞ ¼
X
c02CH
i
aic0uðAdc0;f ;wÞ
Then, for all Ei in E and c0 in CHi ,
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdc0;g;wÞ
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And thus
X
w2W
cðwÞud;f ðR;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0uðAdci;f ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ

X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdc0;g;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0uðAdc0;g;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0uðAdc0;g;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞud;gðRH;wÞ
Now, since RH is not a conditionalizing rule for c, there is cðEiÞ[ 0 and c0 in CHi
such that c0ðÞ 6¼ ciðÞ. Then there is a decision problem d such that Adc0;g does not
maximise expected utility with respect to ci. And thus
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdci;f ;wÞ[
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðAdc0;g;wÞ
In this case, the inequality above is strict, as required.
Now:
• If RH is deterministic but not conditionalizing, let aic0 ¼ 1 for all c0 in Ci. This
gives Theorem 5.
• If RH is non-deterministic but stochastic, let aic0 ¼ PðRHic0 jEiÞ be the probability
of RHic0 given Ei. This gives Theorem 7.
• If RH is non-deterministic and non-stochastic, let aic0 ¼ 1jCH
i
j. This gives
Theorem 8.
This establishes Lemma 16(ii). h
Expected epistemic utility argument
As in the previous section, we first prove a lemma. Theorems 9, 11, and 12 all
follow as corollaries.
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Lemma 17
(i) If R;RH are conditionalizing rules for c , and f, g are selection functions,
then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ ¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
(ii) If R is a conditionalizing rule for c , and RH is not, and f, g are selection
functions, then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ[
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
Proof of Lemma 17 First, (i). Suppose R and RH are conditionalizing rules for
c. Then,
• If cðEiÞ[ 0, then ciðÞ ¼ cHi ðÞ, so EUðci;wÞ ¼ EUðcHi ;wÞ and
cðEiÞEUðci;wÞ ¼ cðEiÞEUðcHi ;wÞ
• If cðEiÞ ¼ 0, then
cðEiÞEUðci;wÞ ¼ cðEiÞEUðcHi ;wÞ
So
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞEUðci;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
cHi ðwÞEUðcHi ;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞEUðcHi ;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
as required. This establishes Lemma 17(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose R is a conditionalizing rule, and RH is not. Now, suppose
that, for each Ei in E and c0 in CHi , there is aic0 [ 0 such that, for each Ei in E,P
c02CH
i
aic0 ¼ 1 and
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EUðRH;wÞ ¼
X
c02CH
i
aic0EUðc0;wÞ
Then, for all Ei in E and c0 in CHi ,
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðc0;wÞ
with strict inequality if c0 6¼ ci. Then
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞEUðci;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2W
ciðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0EUðci;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ

X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðc0;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0EUðc0;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
cðwÞ
X
c02CH
i
aic0EUðc0;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
Now, since RH is not a conditionalizing rule for c, there is cðEiÞ[ 0 and c0 in CHi
such that c0 6¼ ci. Thus
X
w2W
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ[
X
w2W
ciðwÞuðc0;wÞ
In this case, the inequality above is strict, as required. Now:
• If RH is deterministic but not conditionalizing, let aic0 ¼ 1 for all c0 in CHi . This
gives Theorem 9.
• If RH is non-deterministic but stochastic, let aic0 ¼ PðRHic0 jEiÞ be the probability
of RHic0 given Ei. This gives Theorem 11.
• If RH is non-deterministic and non-stochastic, let aic0 ¼ 1jCH
i
j. This gives
Theorem 12.
This establishes Lemma 16(ii). h
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Accuracy dominance argument
Theorem 13 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
And suppose c is a prior and R is a deterministic updating rule. Then:
(i) if hc;Ri is non-conditionalizing, there is hcH;RHi such that, for all w
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞÞ
(ii) if hc;Ri is conditionalizing, there is no hcH;RHi such that, for all w such
that
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞÞ
Proof of Theorem 13 First, (i). Suppose R is deterministic but not conditionalizing
for c. This is the case covered by Briggs and Pettigrew (2018). So
R ¼ ðE ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng; C ¼ fC1; . . .;CngÞ, and, for each Ei, Ci ¼ fcig. So we can
write hc;Ri as a ðnþ 1Þ-dimensional vector of credence functions:
hc; c1; . . .; cni
Now consider the following set of updating plans:
WR ¼ fwR ¼ hw; c1; . . .; ci1;w; ciþ1; . . .; cni : Ei 2 E & w 2 Eig
Thus, wR is the prior-plan pair that has the credence function w as its prior, and will
update exactly as R does except in world w where it will stick with w. Then we can
show that hc;Ri is not in the convex hull of WR. After all:
Lemma 18 hc;Ri is in the convex hull of WR iff R is conditionalizing for c.
Proof of Lemma 18 Let’s prove the left-to-right direction first. Suppose hc;Ri is
in the convex hull of WR. Then there is 0 aw 1 such that
• cðÞ ¼Pw2W awwðÞ;
• ciðÞ ¼
P
w2Ei awwðÞ þ
P
w 62Ei awciðÞ
Thus,
ciðXÞ ¼ cðXEiÞ þ cðEiÞciðXÞ
And so
ciðXÞ ¼ cðXjEiÞ
as required.
Next, the right-to-left direction. Suppose R is conditionalizing for c. So
ciðXÞ ¼ cðXjEiÞ. Then let aw ¼ cðwÞ. It is easy to check that hc;Ri is in the convex
hull of WR, as required. h
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Proof of Theorem 13(i) continued Now, suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper
epistemic utility function. Then, by Proposition 2 in Predd et al. (2009), there is a
Bregman divergence D such that EUðc;wÞ ¼ Dðw; cÞ. Let Dnþ1 be the Bregman
divergence between ðnþ 1Þ-dimensional vectors of credence functions that sums
the Bregman divergences between the nþ 1 credence functions. Thus, by Propo-
sition 3 in Predd et al. (2009), since hc;Ri is not in the convex hull of WR, there is
hcH;RHi in the convex hull of WR such that, for all Ei in E and w in Ei,
Dnþ1ððw; c1; . . .; ci1;w; ciþ1; . . .; cnÞ; ðcH; cH1 ; . . .; cHn ÞÞ
\Dnþ1ððw; c1; . . .; ci1;w; ciþ1; . . .; cnÞ; ðc; c1; . . .; cnÞÞ
But
Dnþ1ððw; c1; . . .; ci1;w; ciþ1; . . .; cnÞ; ðc; c1; . . .; cnÞÞ
¼ Dðw; cÞ þDðw; ciÞ ¼ EUðR;wÞ
And
Dnþ1ððw; c1; . . .; ci1;w; ciþ1; . . .; cnÞ; ðcH; cH1 ; . . .; cHn ÞÞ
Dðw; cHÞ þDðw; cHi Þ ¼ EUðRH;wÞ
So EUðRH;wÞ[EUðR;wÞ for all w in W, as required. This establishes Theo-
rem 13(i).
Second, (ii). Suppose hc;Ri is conditionalizing, and suppose hcH;RHi is an
alternative pair where RH is deterministic. Then we show that c expects hc;Ri to
have at least as much epistemic utility as it expects hcH;RHi to have. So the latter
cannot EU-dominate the former.
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðhc;Ri;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðc;wÞ þ
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðR;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðc;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞEUðci;wÞ

X
w2W
cðwÞEUðcH;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
cðEiÞ
X
w2Ei
ciðwÞEUðcHi ;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðcH;wÞ þ
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðRH;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðhcH;RHi;wÞ
as required. This establishes Theorem 13(ii). h
Before we prove our next theorem, we state and prove this lemma:
Lemma 19 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Suppose C ¼ fc1; . . .; cmg is a finite set of credence functions where m[ 1. Suppose
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a1; . . .; am[ 0 and
Pm
j¼1 aj ¼ 1 . Then there is a credence function cH such that, for
w in W,
EUðcH;wÞ[
Xm
j¼1
ajEUðcj;wÞ
Proof of Lemma 19 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility
function. Then, for each possible world w, we abuse notation and write w for the
credence function defined on F such that wðXÞ ¼ 1 if X is true at w and wðXÞ ¼ 0 if
X is false at w. Then, by Proposition 2 from Predd et al. (2009), there is a Bregman
divergence D that measures the divergence from one credence function to another
such that EUðc;wÞ ¼ Dðw; cÞ.
Suppose C contains m[ 1 credence functions. And suppose a1; . . .; am[ 0 andPm
j¼1 aj ¼ 1. We can then use D to generate a Bregman divergence between two m-
tuples of credence functions as follows:
Daððc1; . . .; cmÞ; ðc01; . . .; c0mÞÞ ¼
Xm
j¼1
ajDðcj; c0jÞ
So
Daððw; . . .;wÞ; ðc1; . . .; cmÞÞ ¼ 
Xm
j¼1
ajEUðcj;wÞ
Now consider the following set of m-tuples of credence functions:
W ¼ fðw; . . .;wÞ : w 2 Wg
Then ðc1; . . .cmÞ is in the convex hull of W iff c1 ¼ c2 ¼ . . . ¼ cm. Thus, by
Proposition 3 in Predd et al. (2009), if ci 6¼ cj for some 1 i; jm, then there is
ðcH; . . .; cHÞ in the convex hull of W such that, for w in W,
Daððw; . . .;wÞ; ðcH; . . .; cHÞÞ\Daððw; . . .;wÞ; ðc1; . . .; cmÞÞ
So
Xm
j¼1
ajEUðcH;wÞ ¼ EUðcH;wÞ[
Xm
j¼1
ajEUðcj;wÞ
as required. h
Theorem 15 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then, if hc;Ri is non-conditionalizing, there is hcH;RHi such that, for all w,
EUðhc;Ri;wÞ\EUðhcH;RHi;wÞ
Proof of Theorem 15 Suppose hc;Ri is non-conditionalizing. If R is deterministic,
we can appeal to Theorem 13. If R is non-deterministic, then we can use Lemma 19
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to construct a dominating pair hcH;RHi. After all, if Ci contains more than one
possible posterior, then there are aic0 [ 0 such that
P
c02Ci a
i
c0 ¼ 1 and, for w in Ei,
EUðR;wÞ ¼
X
c02Ci
aic0EUðc0;wÞ
If R is stochastic, then aic0 ¼ PðRic0 jEiÞ; if R is non-stochastic, then aic0 ¼ 1jCij. Now, by
Lemma 19, there is cHi such that, for all w in W,
EUðcHi ;wÞ[
X
c02Ci
aic0EUðc0;wÞ
Thus, let RH be the updating rule such that CHj ¼ Cj for all j 6¼ i, and CHi ¼ fcHi g.
Also, let cH ¼ c. Then:
EUðhcH;RHi;wÞ[EUðhc;Ri;wÞ
as required. h
Theorem 14 Suppose EU is an additive, strictly proper epistemic utility function.
Then:
(i) If R is a weak or strong super-conditionalizing rule for c, there is no
hcH;RHi such that, for all Ei in E;w in Ei; c0 in Ci and cH0 in CHi
EUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ\EUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
(ii) There are rules R that are not weak or strong super-conditionalizing rules
for c such that there is no hcH;RHi such that, for all Ei in E;w in Ei; c0 in Ci
and cH0 in CHi
EUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ\EUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
Proof of Theorem 14 First, (i). Suppose hc;Ri is a weak or a strong super-
conditionalizing pair. Thus, we can extend c to c so that, for Ei in E and c0 in Ci, if
cðEiÞ[ 0.
c0ðÞ ¼ cðjRic0 Þ
Thus,
cðw & Ric0 Þ ¼ cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞ
Now suppose hcH;RHi is an alternative prior-rule pair. Then extend c further so
that:
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cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ ¼
1
jCHi j
cðw & Ric0 Þ ¼
1
jCHi j
cðRic0 Þc0ðwÞ
Then:
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02Ci
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 ÞEUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðc;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
X
w2Ei
cðw & Ric0 ÞEUðc0;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðc;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þ
X
w2W
c0ðwÞEUðc0;wÞ

X
w2W
cðwÞEUðcH;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
cðRic0 Þ
X
w2W
c0ðwÞEUðcH0;wÞ
¼
X
w2W
cðwÞEUðcH;wÞ þ
X
Ei2E
X
c02Ci
X
w2W
cðw & Ric0 ÞEUðcH0;wÞ
¼
X
Ei2E
X
w2Ei
X
c02Ci
X
cH02Ci
cðw & Ric0 & RHicH0 ÞEUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
Thus, it cannot be the case that for all Ei in E, w in Ei, c0 in Ci and cH0 in CHi
EUðhc;Ri;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ\EUðhcH;RHi;w & Ric0 & RHicH0 Þ
This establishes Theorem 14(i).
Next, (ii). Suppose E ¼ fE1; . . .;Eng and w1;w2 are in E1. Then pick c, c1, c2 so
that they lie on the line between w1 and w2. Pick: c very close to w1; c1 very close to
c, but slightly further towards w2; and c2 right at the end of the line at w2. So c is not
in the convex hull of c1 and c2. Next, define R ¼ ðE; CÞ with C1 ¼ fc1; c2g. Now
suppose cH is an alternative prior and RH ¼ ðE; CHÞ is an alternative updating rule,
with cH0 in CH1 . Then, if hcH;RHi dominates hc;Ri, then:
(i) EUðc;w1Þ þ EUðc1;w1Þ\EUðcH;w1Þ þ EUðcH0;w1Þ
(ii) EUðc;w2Þ þ EUðc2;w2Þ\EUðcH;w2Þ þ EUðcH0;w2Þ
Now, suppose cH is equal to c or lies between c and w1. Then
EUðcH;w2ÞEUðc;w2Þ. But since c2 ¼ w2, EUðcH0;w2ÞEUðc2;w2Þ. So
EUðc;w2Þ þ EUðc2;w2ÞEUðcH;w2Þ þ EUðcH0;w2Þ
which contradicts (ii). And similarly for cH0. So both cH and cH0 must lie strictly
between c and w2. And indeed, they must lie strictly between c and c1. If one or
other lies between c1 and w2, then
EUðc;w1Þ þ EUðc1;w1ÞEUðcH;w1Þ þ EUðcH0;w1Þ
which contradicts (i). Now, since EU is continuous in its first argument and
EUðc;w2Þ\EUðc2;w2Þ, we can always pick c1 so that it’s close enough to c that
EUðc1;w2Þ is close enough to EUðc;w2Þ that
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EUðc1;w2Þ þ EUðc1;w2Þ\EUðc;w2Þ þ EUðc2;w2Þ
But then, since cH and cH0 lie between c1 and c, we have
EUðcH;w2Þ þ EUðcH0;w2Þ\EUðc1;w2Þ þ EUðc1;w2Þ
\EUðc;w2Þ þ EUðc2;w2Þ
which contradicts (ii). This gives our contradiction. So hcH;RHi does not dominate
hc;Ri. h
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